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MARITAL STATUS AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION 
IN INFERTILITY CARE 
By Richard F. Storrow* 
Introduction 
During a visit to her dentist in 1994 for a routine cleaning, Sidney Abbott disclosed on 
her patient information form that she was a carrier of the human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV).1  Her dentist, Randon Bragdon, examined her teeth and found a cavity, but he refused 
to fill it outside a hospital setting.2  In her subsequent lawsuit against Bragdon for violating 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Abbott testified that her HIV had influenced her 
decision not to have children.3  In 1998, the Supreme Court ruled in Abbott’s case that the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), enacted in 1990, protects those living with HIV and 
AIDS from discrimination because those conditions substantially limit the major life activity 
of reproduction.4 
Bragdon v. Abbott was a watershed for people living with HIV and AIDS and remains a 
landmark in the landscape of ADA jurisprudence.  It has significance, too, for the infertile, 
who see in the language of the Supreme Court an acknowledgment that infertility itself may 
be considered a disability.5  Whether one is infertile, however, is not as easy to determine as 
whether one is a carrier of HIV.  Infertility requires a more contextualized diagnosis than 
does HIV and has been variously defined and understood.  Does infertility exist only where 
a heterosexual couple cannot conceive a child after engaging in sexual intercourse for a 
certain period of time?6  Can gay and lesbian couples and single individuals also be infertile 
even if they do not engage in reproductive sexual activity?  The lack of fixed agreement 
about what constitutes infertility raises questions about who is a deserving recipient of 
assisted reproductive treatment.  The answers to those questions have important implications 
for those who need to employ assisted reproduction to have children and are hopeful of 
finding a medical professional willing to help them.     !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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1 LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, THE AIDS PANDEMIC: COMPLACENCY, INJUSTICE, AND UNFULFILLED 
EXPECTATIONS 117 (2004).  
2 Id.  
3 RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 
212 (2002). 
4 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998). 
5 Some district courts have declared infertility to be a disability under the ADA.  Saks v. Franklin Covey 
Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) aff’d in part, remanded in part, 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003); 
Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1405 (N.D. Ill. 1994).  Other courts have qualified this 
doctrine.  A mere “difficulty in reproducing,” McBride v. City of Detroit, No. 07-12794, 2008 WL 5062890, at 
*5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 2008) (citing Sauer v. Univ. Internal Med. Assocs., No. 1:06CV264, 2008 WL 
731492, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2008)), and infertility brought on by aging, Saks, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 326, 
have been held not to be disabilities.  In Sheils v. Univ. of Pa. Med. Ctr., the plaintiffs alleged a clinic’s 
screening protocols constituted disability discrimination.  Since the plaintiffs had not been denied infertility 
treatment, their claim was dismissed.  No. CIV.A. 97-5510, 1998 WL 134220, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1998).   
6 Mi Young Hwang, Infertility Options, 282 J. AMER. MED. ASSOC. 1888 (1999); Infertility, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/topics/infertility/en (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
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This article addresses, in particular, the obstacles gay and lesbian couples and single 
individuals7 face when attempting to have children using assisted reproduction.  As Marla 
Hollandsworth sees it, “[p]arenthood for gay men and lesbians has always been an issue of 
societal condemnation, social discomfort, and repudiation.”8  Single individuals, too, 
especially women, elicit opprobrium and bias when they choose to have children on their 
own.9  In the United States, where few laws exist that define who may and who may not 
have access to assisted reproduction, these groups will face discrimination primarily from 
unwilling physicians and laws that mandate insurance coverage only for those who meet a 
narrow and heterocentric definition of infertility.  In other countries, laws may explicitly 
exclude gays, lesbians, and singles from eligibility for treatment.  In still others, the 
differential application of the law may stymie the efforts of same-sex couples to use medical 
technology to have children.  Individually, these laws may appear to have little impact on 
the reproductive desires of nontraditional families.  Collectively, however, they are a 
reflection of the perspective that medical technology is most appropriately employed to 
enable heterosexual couples to have children. 
This article unfolds in the following manner: Part I discusses statutory and other legal 
barriers that prevent gays, lesbians, and single persons from building their families with the 
use of assisted reproduction.   This part is divided into two subsections, one that addresses 
laws that explicitly limit access to assisted reproduction to heterosexual couples and another 
that examines laws and policies that are not on their face discriminatory but, in their 
application, limit access by gays, lesbians, and singles.  Part II explores the bias that some 
infertility clinics may display toward gays, lesbians, and singles who seek treatment.  This 
part focuses on the United States, where laws prohibiting such discrimination are 
uncommon.  It asks specifically whether either laws forbidding discrimination in public 
accommodations or medical ethics principles can effectively combat private discrimination 
against gays, lesbians, and singles seeking access to assisted reproduction. 
Statutory and Other Legal Barriers 
Statutory and other legal barriers to assisted reproduction tend to reify what scholars 
have identified as a heteronormative bias in the delivery of assisted reproduction.10  The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 For the purposes of this paper, the term “single individuals” encompasses single persons of all sexual 
orientations and gender identities.   
8 Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for 
Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 183, 184 (1995).   
9 For Single Mothers, Stigma Difficult to Shake, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 24, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/02/24/134031175/For-Single-Mothers-Stigma-Difficult-To-Shake (reporting that 
70% of approximately 3,000 Americans surveyed expressed the view “that single women raising children on 
their own is bad for society”); Molly M. Ginty, Single Mothers-to-Be Face Bias, Race Ticking Clock, WE 
NEWS (June 18, 2004), http://womensenews.org/story/health/040618/single-mothers-be-face-bias-race-ticking-
clock (reporting story of single woman denied treatment by clinic that “reserved donor sperm for married 
heterosexual couples”).  
10 Sarena Sairan, Queer Kinships: A Quandary of Love Without Borders 30 (2008) (discussing the 
heteronormativity of Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ryerson.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1548&context=dissertations; see also SHIREEN 
KASHMERI, UNRAVELING SURROGACY IN ONTARIO, CANADA.  AN ETHNOGRAPHIC INQUIRY ON THE INFLUENCE 
OF CANADA’S ASSISTED HUMAN REPRODUCTION ACT (2004), SURROGACY CONTRACTS, PARENTAGE LAWS, 
AND GAY FATHERHOOD 106 (2008), available at http://claradoc.gpa.free.fr/doc/100.pdf ; Erez Aloni, Cloning 
and the LGBTI Family: Cautious Optimism, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 57 (2011) (detailing how 
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manifestation of this bias takes several forms, ranging from laws that limit the use of 
assisted reproduction to heterosexual couples, to policies that deny legal recognition of 
families that have already been created.11    
Most developed countries have comprehensive legislative regimes that regulate access 
to assisted reproduction.  These legislative schemes can be categorized in the following 
manner:  (1) permissive; (2) cautious; and (3) prohibitive.12  Permissive jurisdictions allow 
most procedures and typically do not limit access to assisted reproductive technology based 
on marital status or sexual orientation.13  Cautious jurisdictions occupy a middle ground 
between permissive jurisdictions and prohibitive jurisdictions in terms of the types of 
procedures they will allow; however, they may permit only stable heterosexual couples to 
have access to assisted reproduction.14  Assistance to single women is not permitted.15  
Lastly, the prohibitive approach is characterized by bans on techniques that are elsewhere 
embraced as mainstream procedures and by limitations on access to stable heterosexual 
couples.  In these jurisdictions, oocyte donation is banned outright,16 and there may be 
similar restrictions on using donor sperm for in vitro fertilization (IVF).17 
Facially Discriminatory Regulation 
Facially discriminatory regulation of assisted reproduction either gives married couples 
exclusive access or limits access to heterosexual couples.  Other provisions are so readily 
identifiable as excluding gays, lesbians, and singles that they cannot with any seriousness be 
labeled neutral.  For example, one of the most exclusionary statutory mandates, albeit rare, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
heteronormative assumptions underlie objections to reproductive cloning). 
11 Kelly M. O’Bryan, Mommy or Daddy and Me: A Contract Solution to a Child’s Loss of the Lesbian or 
Transgender Nonbiological Parent, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1115, 1116-17 (2011); Laura T. Kessler, 
Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2005).  Some perceive a “new illegitimacy” emerging 
in the legal treatment of the children of same-sex couples.  See Nancy D. Polikoff, The New “Illegitimacy”: 
Winning Backward in the Protection of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 721, 740 (2012); Benjamin G. Ledsham, Means to Legitimate Ends: Same–sex Marriage Through the Lens 
of Illegitimacy-based Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373, 2375 (2007). 
12 See Linda Nielsen, Legal Consensus and Divergence in Europe in the Area of Assisted Conception—Room 
for Harmonisation?, in CREATING THE CHILD 305, 306 (Donald Evans ed., 1996). 
13 See generally HOWARD W. JONES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF FERTILITY SOCIETIES 
SURVEILLANCE 2010, available at http://www.iffs-reproduction.org/documents/IFFS_Surveillance_2010.pdf 
[hereinafter IFFS SURVEILLANCE 2010].   
14 HOWARD W. JONES ET AL., SUPPLEMENT TO FERTILITY AND STERILITY, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF 
FERTILITY SOCIETIES SURVEILLANCE 2007 S18 (2007), available at http://www.iffs-
reproduction.org/documents/Surveillance_07.pdf [hereinafter IFFS SURVEILLANCE 2007].   
15 N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 187 (1998). 
16 IFFS SURVEILLANCE 2010, supra note 13, at 47-48.  The European Court of Human Rights, in S.H. and 
Others v. Austria, ruled that Austria’s ban on oocyte donation and its ban on sperm donation for IVF did not 
violate the right to private and family life.  S.H. v Austria, Application No. 57813/00 (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-107325.  The case is good evidence that the 
European Court of Human Rights will not consider assisted reproduction to be a human right at any time in the 
foreseeable future.  Richard Storrow, S.H. v. Austria Denies Infertile Europeans Human Rights, BIONEWS (Jan. 
23, 2012), http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_117832.asp.    
17 IFFS SURVEILLANCE 2010, supra note 13, at 46-48.    
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is one that bars access to assisted reproduction unless the patients are able to demonstrate 
their “medical infertility.”18     
Although the Muslim world is relatively uniform in limiting access to assisted 
reproduction to heterosexual married couples,19 mandated exclusion of unmarried persons 
from access to assisted reproduction is unusual in developed countries.20  Oklahoma limits 
artificial insemination to use by heterosexual married couples,21 and some jurisdictions that 
allow surrogacy impose a similar requirement.22  Other developed countries, however, if 
they place any restrictions on who may have access to assisted reproduction, tend to draw 
the line at “stable” heterosexual couples.23  Even countries that ban egg and sperm donation, 
insisting on the importance of genetic links between parents and children, do not always 
require the couple seeking treatment to be married.24  Italy, for example, passed laws barring 
all but heterosexual couples who employ their own gametes from having access to assisted 
reproduction.  This legal regime is recognized as the most restrictive in Europe.25  In passing 
the restrictions, the fashioning of which was of particular interest to the Roman Catholic 
Church,26 the legislature was expressing its belief that its formerly permissive stance caused 
harm to the reputation of the country and its physicians, harm to future children who would 
not be raised by their biological progenitors, and harm to donors from unsafe procedures or 
conditions that exploit their poverty or vulnerability.       
In the early days of IVF, the Warnock Commission in Great Britain considered how 
reproductive technology should be regulated.  Its ultimate recommendation was to limit 
treatment to heterosexual couples based on the idea that children would fare better being !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18JOHN SEYMOUR & SONIA MAGRI, A.R.T., SURROGACY AND LEGAL PARENTAGE: A COMPARATIVE 
LEGISLATIVE REVIEW 22 n.110 (2004), available at 
http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/ARTOccasional%20PaperComparativeLegislative.pdf  
(citing Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 1988); S. AUSTL. HEALTH, ACCESS TO ART AT A REGISTERED 
CLINIC IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA (2011), available at 
http://www.sahealth.sa.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/60b1688043a636fca671eeed1a914d95/ART+FS1-
Access+to+ART-sahealth-2011.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=60b1688043a636fca671eeed1a914d95. 
19 Marcia C. Inhorn, Fatwas and ARTs: IVF and Gamete Donation in Sunni v. Shi'a Islam, 9 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 291, 300 (2005). 
20 Richard F. Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption Through the Regulation of Assisted Reproduction, 35 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 479 (2006).  This is not to say there have been no efforts to enact such restrictions.  See, e.g., 
Elizabeth Weil, Breeder Reaction, MOTHER JONES (Jul.-Aug. 2006), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/07/breeder-reaction,  (mentioning bills that failed in Indiana and 
Virginia).   
21OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 553 (West 2012). 
22 Diane S. Hinson & Maureen McBrien, Surrogacy Across America, 34 FAM. ADVOCATE 32, 34 (2011) 
(mentioning Virginia); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(b) (“The intended parents must be married to each 
other.”) 
23 Storrow, supra note 20, at 487-88.  
24 See, e.g., Legge 19 Febbraio 2004, n.40, Norme in Materia di Procreazione Medicalmente Assistita, art. 
5 (It.), available at http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/04040l.htm.  France permits gamete donation but 
requires that donations be strictly anonymous in the interest of creating nuclear family look-alikes.  Ariane 
Poulantzas, L’Anonymat dans la Procréation Médicalement Assistée: Entretien avec Jean-Marie Kuntsmann, 
LA VIE DES IDÉES, (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.laviedesidees.fr/L-anonymat-dans-la-procreation.html?lang=fr. 
25 Claudio Manna & Luciano G. Nardo, Italian Law on Assisted Conception: Clinical and Research 
Implications, 11 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 532, 533 (2005).  
26Andrea Boggio, Italy Enacts New Law on Medically Assisted Reproduction, 20 HUM. REPROD. 1153, 
1156-57 (2005); Rachel Anne Fenton, Catholic Doctrine Versus Women’s Rights: The New Italian Law on 
Assisted Reproduction, 14 MED. L. REV. 73, 75-79 (2006).   
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raised in a heterosexual-couple-headed household.27  The legislation that was passed in 1990 
based on these recommendations required the licensure of assisted reproductive treatment.  
Among the criteria necessary to consider in each case was the need of the child for a 
father.28  During the years that this factor was a required consideration, the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) permitted clinics to engage in a wide range 
of screening practices, including best-interests screening.29 The clinical application of the 
standard came under sustained attack by infertile couples and individuals, scholars, and even 
members of Parliament30 as varying widely across clinics and resulting in discriminatory 
and arbitrary screening within individual clinics.31  In response, the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) conducted a study on clinical screening practices in the 
United Kingdom.32  In a remarkable turnabout said to be motivated to “provide greater 
clarity and give clinics more confidence about deciding whether or not treatment is 
appropriate,” the HFEA has quite pointedly embraced the avoidance-of-harm principle in 
gatekeeping33 and has revised its code of practice with appropriate language.34 A new 
guidance issued by the HFEA in November of 2005 permits nothing beyond fitness 
screening.35  Henceforth, clinics in the United Kingdom must entertain a presumption in 
favor of providing treatment and may not refuse treatment unless there is evidence that the 
child is likely to suffer serious physical or psychological harm.36  The new approach has 
been fully implemented as of January 2006.37  In a further development in 2008, Parliament !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SEC., Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology 10-12 (1984) (U.K.). 
28 See HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY ACT, 1990, c. 37, § 25(1)-(2) (U.K.); HUM. 
FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., CODE OF PRACTICE 29 (6th ed. 2003), available at 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-3F57D79B-151028BF/hfea/Code_of_Practice_Sixth_Edition_-
_final.pdf. 
29 Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper Standard for 
Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, CARDOZO L. REV. 2283, 2316 (2007). 
30 See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE REPORT FROM THE HOUSE OF 
COMMONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE: HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW, 
2005, Cm. 6641, at 15-17 (U.K.); Louise Gray, Fertility Laws’ Revamp Could Allow Choice on Baby’s Sex, 
The Scotsman (U.K.), Aug. 17, 2005, at 6. 
31 Barry Nelson, Infertility Boss Calls for Rules to be Relaxed, THE NORTHERN ECHO, Jan. 20, 2005, at 15; 
Lyndsay Moss, “Designer Baby” Review Launched by Government, WESTERN MORNING NEWS (U.K.), Aug. 
17, 2005, at 42.  
32 See HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., TOMORROW'S CHILDREN: REPORT OF THE POLICY 
REVIEW OF WELFARE OF THE CHILD ASSESSMENTS IN LICENSED ASSISTED CONCEPTION CLINICS 6 (2005) 
(U.K.), available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/TomorrowsChildren_report.pdf. 
33 Id.  at 6 (“The involvement of a medical team in assisted conception means that certain third parties 
have some responsibility towards the child to be born. However, the importance of patient autonomy means 
that clinics should only refuse to provide treatment where there is evidence that the child is likely to suffer 
serious physical or psychological harm.”). 
34 See HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., CODE OF PRACTICE §§ 3.1-3.24 (6th ed. 2003), 
available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Code_of_Practice_Sixth_Edition.pdf. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. at § 3.1. 
37 Improved Welfare Checks System Will Be Better, Fairer and Clearer for Fertility Patients, GPs and 
Clinics, HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY (Nov. 2, 2005), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/667.html. 
This is likewise the case in Australia and Canada. See Julian Savulescu, Assisted Reproduction for HIV 
Serodiscordant Couples: The Ethical Issues in Perspective, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 53, 53 (2003); Canadian 
Parliament Approves the “Assisted Human Reproduction Act,” A Model of Responsible Policy, CENTER FOR 
GENETICS & SOC’Y (May 17, 2004), http://www.genetics-and-society.org/policies/other/canada.html. 
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altered the mandate to consider the child’s need for a father to read “the need for supportive 
parenting.”38  This change was celebrated as a victory for same-sex couples and single 
women alike.  A similar inclusive spirit was behind the enactment of New Zealand’s 
regulation of assisted reproduction in 200439 and recently concluded reform efforts in 
Victoria, Australia.40  
Some jurisdictions that have placed heterosexual marriage restrictions on access to 
assisted reproduction have been forced to dismantle their restrictions based on prevailing 
human rights norms.  For example, two Australian states, Victoria and South Australia, 
originally enacted laws that excluded all but married heterosexual couples and heterosexual 
couples in “de facto” relationships from access to assisted reproduction.41  These laws 
spurred interstate travel by single women and lesbian couples wishing to obtain treatment.42  
In subsequent lawsuits against these states, infertility physicians who wished to accept single 
women as patients claimed that these restrictions ran afoul of the prohibition on marital 
status discrimination in Australia’s federal Sex Discrimination Act.43  The courts in both 
cases found restraints on access based on marital status to be inconsistent with the Sex 
Discrimination Act.44  The ruling did not open up infertility treatment to single women and 
same-sex couples, however, as both jurisdictions’ statutes contained the requirement that the 
patient presenting for treatment be medically infertile, a requirement that single women and 
lesbian couples seeking treatment rarely fulfill.45 
After many years of struggling for equal treatment in Australia’s states and provinces, 
single women and lesbians celebrated the repeal, in December of 2008, of Victoria’s 
Infertility Treatment Act of 1995.46  Instead of requiring patients to be medically infertile, 
the new Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act gives access to assisted reproduction 
procedures to single women and lesbian couples whose “circumstances” satisfy the doctor !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, DEP’T HEALTH, 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Legislation/Actsandbills/DH_080211 (last updated July 26, 
2010). 
39 See HUMAN ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY ACT 2004 § 4(a), SR 2004/92 (N.Z.), available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2004/0092/latest/whole.html (listing child welfare as “an important 
consideration”). 
40 VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND ADOPTION-ACCESS 
(2005), available at http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/PositionPaper%2B1.pdf. 
41 See, e.g., Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Cth) div 2.8 (Austl.), reprinted in 48 INT. DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 
24 (1997). 
42 Liz Porter, When Baby Makes Two: The Journey to Joy for Women Who Decide It’s Better to Be a 
Single Mum Than No Mum at All, THE AGE, May 9, 2010, at 10 (Austl.). 
43 McBain v. Victoria (2000) 99 FCA 116, 119, (Austl.) (citing Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 22 
(Austl.)); Porter, supra note 42, at 10 (“In 2000, McBain was responsible for the Victorian government 
overturning its policy of restricting IVF to married couples. He successfully argued in the Federal Court that 
the law was inconsistent with the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act.”).  The Act defines marital status as 
inclusive of de facto marital relationships.   
44 Id. at 124; Pearce v. South Australian Health Commissioner (1996) 66 SASR 486, 487-88  (Austl.) 
45 Crystal Liu, Restricting Access to Infertility Services: What Is a Justified Limitation on Reproductive 
Freedom?, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. &TECH. 291, 312 (2009). 
46 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 126 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/PubStatbook.nsf/f932b66241ecf1b7ca256e9200
0e23be/3ADFC9FBA2C0F526CA25751C0020E494/$FILE/08-076a.pdf; David Rood, Singles, Lesbians Win 
Fertility Rights, THE AGE (Dec. 5, 2008), http://www.theage.com.au/national/singles-lesbians-win-fertility-
rights-20081204-6rqy.html. 
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that the patient is unlikely to have a child without medical assistance.47  Medically assisting 
a single woman or a woman in a same-sex couple to become pregnant creates a 
presumption, via an amendment to the Status of Children Act of 1974, that the patient’s 
female partner is also a parent of the child if she consents to a procedure, excluding self-
insemination,48 by which her female partner becomes pregnant.49  The semen donor and/or 
egg donor is not a parent, whether or not he is known to the couple, or to a single woman 
undergoing the procedure.50The most controversial amendment of the new law is the 
requirement that patients presenting for treatment provide a “national criminal records 
check” to their infertility physician, give permission to providers to perform child protection 
order checks on patients presenting for treatment,51  and submit to two sessions of face-to-
face counseling.52  These requirements were for the purpose of ascertaining that: 
No charges under clause 1 or clause 2 of the Sentencing Act 1991 have been 
proven against the patient and her partner and that a child protection check is 
provided which specifies that no child protection order has been made 
removing a child from the custody or guardianship of the woman or her 
partner.53  
The medical infertility requirement, where it is still the law, remains a significant 
barrier to treatment.54  The requirement continues to plague denizens of South Australia, 
making it necessary that applicants for treatment be “classified as infertile,”55 and forces 
lesbian couples to travel interstate to more permissive jurisdictions like New South Wales, 
Victoria, and the Australian Capital Territory.56  Moreover, there is no presumption under 
state law “of parentage for same-sex co-parents.”57  This can lead to problems between the 
co-parent and the child’s school and medical providers.58  The good news is that the South 
Australia legislature is close to dismantling the medical infertility requirement.59  Even so, 
Medicare does not reimburse women who are not medically infertile.60  This disparity of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008, supra note 46, at s 10.  This includes problems achieving 
pregnancy, carrying a pregnancy to term, or the possibility that without treatment the woman might give birth 
to a child with a genetic disease or abnormality.  
48 Id. at s 3 (defining “treatment procedure”). 
49 Id. at s 147.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. at s 42.  
52 Porter, supra note 42, at 10. 
53 VICT. STATE GOV’T DEP’T OF HEALTH, INFORMATION FROM THE CHIEF HEALTH OFFICER REGARDING 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS UNDER THE ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TREATMENT ACT 2008 
(2010), available at http://www.health.vic.gov.au/art/documents/info_for_doctors.pdf. 
54 Jenni Millbank, The New Surrogacy Parentage Laws in Australia: Cautious Regulation or ‘25 Brick 
Walls’?, 35 MELB. U.  L. REV. 165, 180-81 (2011). 
55 Id. at 181. 
56 Wong Highlights IVF Inequity, STAR OBSERVER (Aug. 19, 2011), 
http://www.starobserver.com.au/news/2011/08/19/wong-highlights-ivf-inequity/59189. 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Lesbians a Step Closer to IVF, STAR OBSERVER (May 4, 2012), 
http://www.starobserver.com.au/news/2012/05/04/lesbians-a-step-close-to-ivf/76870. 
60 Porter, supra note 42, at 10; Soren Holm, Infertility, Childlessness and the Need for Treatment: Is 
Childlessness a Social or a Medical Problem?, in CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS, LAW, AND PRACTICE OF 
ASSISTED PROCREATION 65, 70 (Donald Evans  ed., 1996). 
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approximately $10,000 between the cost that medically infertile women must pay versus 
what socially infertile women must pay will remain an effective bar keeping some from 
pursuing treatment.61 
South Australian legislators are right to call into question the view that there is a 
medical bright line separating those who may obtain treatment from those who may not.62  
Medical infertility could result from conditions such as endometriosis, fibroids, blocked 
fallopian tubes or azoospermia,63 but it also has a social dimension.  A purely medical 
definition of infertility would hold that a woman capable of becoming pregnant with 
someone other than her current male partner is not medically infertile: 
Let us imagine a couple in which the wife has developed antibodies against 
specific antigens on her husband’s spermatozoa.  This couple is infertile 
when seen as a couple, but taken separately they are in perfect health.  With a 
change of partner each of them would be as fertile as anybody else.64  
The South Australian approach, however, appears to allow treatment in cases not so 
much of medical infertility but of reproductive incompatibility, introducing a social factor 
into the definition.65  Indeed, the statute itself speaks not only of infertility but of the 
appearance of infertility of the woman or her partner after they have engaged in the requisite 
twelve months of unprotected sexual intercourse. 66 Reproductive incompatibility among 
heterosexual couples, not medical infertility, is thus the primary key to accessing infertility 
treatment in South Australia.  
In order to bring single women into this discussion, as Stuhmcke does in her analysis67 
and to further underscore the inescapable social dimension of infertility, I would go further 
and, borrowing a line from the insurance industry, argue that infertility is not a medical 
condition at all, because the condition itself cannot be cured through assisted reproduction.68  
I am not here defending insurance companies that try to refuse coverage for infertility 
treatment but simply wish to point out how unmoored the notion of medical infertility is 
from any fixed, non-contextual reality.  Commentators have noted that there is no fixed 
definition of infertility, but that it is more than anything a social construct.69  Individuals are 
not themselves infertile but are infertile only in relation to those with whom they seek to 
reproduce.  Infertility has meaning, then, only when we consider these particular pairings.  If 
only heterosexual couples can be infertile, then it is indisputably the same-sex feature of the 
lesbian couple that lies behind the refusal to provide in J.M. and behind the restrictive 
medical definition of infertility itself.70 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61Porter, supra note 42, at 10. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Holm, supra note 60, at 70. 
65 The analogy in the United States is to insurance companies that recognize infertility as existing only 
within heterosexual couples who turn out to be reproductively incompatible. 
66 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 1988 (SA) s 9 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/ASSISTED%20REPRODUCTIVE%20TREATMENT%20ACT%20
1988/CURRENT/1988.10.UN.PDF.  
67 Id. 
68 Kinzie v. Physician’s Liability Ins. Co., 750 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Okla. Civ. App. 1987) (noting that the 
infertility is not corrected by in vitro fertilization). 
69 See, e.g., Arthur Greil et al., The Social Construction of Infertility, 5 SOC. COMPASS 736 (2011).   
70 Anita Stuhmcke, Limiting Access to Assisted Reproduction: JM v. QFG, 16 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 245, 
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Courts have routinely refused to recognize this more rarefied understanding of 
infertility.  If we resort to the case law, we find that the courts that deem infertility a disorder 
invariably do so with the use of the arbitrary medical definition, entrenching even further the 
misguided view that only heterosexual couples can be infertile.71  
I think infertility is better understood as a disability of which the effect on normal life 
activities can be diminished by medical intervention.  This understanding would include not 
only heterosexual couples who wish to reproduce but cannot, but also gay and lesbian 
couples and singles who have similar goals.  Whether medical intervention is required at all, 
therefore, would depend not upon marital status or sexual orientation but upon whether there 
is volition to reproduce in the first instance.  Just as heterosexual couples who do not want to 
reproduce are not infertile, single women who wish to employ assisted reproduction are.  
This approach to infertility may have the disadvantage of lacking the physiological and 
copulative bright lines of the traditional medical definition, but it has the advantage of 
making transparent the otherwise hidden social dimension of any diagnosis of infertility.  It 
has the further advantage of emphasizing that not all disabilities are medical conditions.  
Infertility is one of these.  It is a social condition that interferes with a major life activity, as 
the Supreme Court recognized in Bragdon.72 
The distinction between medical and social infertility does not have much influence in 
the United States, where regulations defining who may have access to assisted reproduction 
are virtually nonexistent.73  Instead, in the few states with statutes mandating that health 
plans include coverage to help the medically infertile pay for reproduction-assisting 
technologies, gays, lesbians, and singles will have to find other sources of financial support 
to pay for the treatments they need.  These mandates take two different forms:  one group 
requires insurers to offer infertility treatment to group plan sponsors; the other requires 
insurers to provide coverage.74  For example, Hawaii, Arkansas, and Maryland mandate 
insurance coverage for legally married couples.75  This may be meant to express societal 
disapproval of reproductive technology for any but married couples, or it may be a statement 
about the responsibility of the insurance industry to assist only those with a medical 
condition.  Either way, lesbian and gay couples and unmarried heterosexuals are excluded. 
The legal definition of infertility in insurance legislation is informed by the medical 
definition of infertility, the inability of an opposite-sex couple to achieve a pregnancy after a 
year of engaging in regular and unprotected sexual intercourse. 76  Insurance laws in New 
Jersey, Hawaii, Maryland, California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, for 
example, all define infertility as arising from some medical condition that prevents 
pregnancy and is tied to some abnormality in the physiology of either the man or the woman 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
249-50 (2002) (explaining that infertility is a heterosexual construct). 
71 Id. at 252. 
72 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998). 
73 The possibility that this distinction may be used by individual infertility clinics to prevent certain classes 
of people from having access to treatment will be explored in Part II, infra. 
74 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LAWS RELATED TO INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR 
INFERTILITY TREATMENT (2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/insurance-coverage-
for-infertility-laws.aspx. 
75 ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-85-137 (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (2012); 
MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810 (West 2012). 
76 Hwang, supra note 6.  
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who wishes to have a child with someone of the opposite sex.77   These definitions, if 
determinative of who is infertile, suggest that infertility refers to those whose gametes or 
gestational capacities render them unable to have a healthy child with their opposite-sex 
partner.   This definition does not include those who wish to have and raise children with 
someone of the same sex or by themselves.  As in South Australia, then, medical infertility 
in the United States is a dividing line between heterosexual couples who cannot achieve 
pregnancy and same-sex couples and singles who would also benefit from insurance 
coverage.78    
Facially Neutral Regulation 
Many legal policies that impede gays, lesbians, and singles from having access to 
assisted reproduction are facially neutral.  These include bans on reproductive tourism, laws 
that ban self-insemination and sperm donation by gay men, parentage laws that make it 
difficult to achieve legal recognition of a social parent, and immigration policies that restrict 
recognition of children born of surrogacy. 
Some countries ban third-party gamete donation, thus limiting access to heterosexual 
couples.  Such regimes may be accompanied by bans on reproduction tourism, as in 
Turkey’s ban on leaving the country for artificial insemination and New South Wales’ ban 
on international commercial surrogacy.79  Although the European Court of Human Rights 
recently declared that the availability of fertility tourism was a factor weighing against a 
finding that restrictions on human-assisted reproduction violate human rights,80 many people 
have no access to the means to pursue such travel, and most of the world lies outside of a 
free-trade zone that allows Europeans to escape restrictive reproductive laws by traveling to 
friendlier European countries.  A gamete donation or surrogacy ban, coupled with a fertility 
tourism ban, is the strongest prohibition yet devised on the creation of families headed by 
gay and lesbian or single parents.     
Related to bans on reproductive tourism are immigration policies geared toward 
deterring international commercial surrogacy.  Such policies may exist in countries that 
either outlaw surrogacy or forbid its being the subject of a commercial transaction,81 leading 
citizens of such countries to travel to jurisdictions like India, the United States, or the 
Ukraine, where surrogacy is legal.82  Either way, such policies have a disparate impact on 
gay male couples or singles whose sole reproductive option is to engage a surrogate to 
contribute the gestational component to the creation of their children.   Upon bringing a 
child back to the country that prohibits commercial surrogacy, numerous families have 
encountered serious problems.  Not only will some governments refuse to recognize the 
parent-child relationships in such situations,83 but France recently refused to recognize the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A 
LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 221-23 (2d ed. 2011). 
78 Id. at 15-16. 
79 Richard F. Storrow, Assisted Reproduction on Treacherous Terrain: The Legal Hazards of Cross-
Border Reproductive Travel, 23 REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 538, 539 (2011). 
80 S.H. v Austria, App. No. 57813/00, (2011), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-107325. 
81 Storrow,  supra note 79, at 539-40 & 543. 
82 Emilio de Benito, Justicia Abre la Puerta a la Inscripción de los Hijos de ‘Vientre de Alquiler’, EL PAÍS 
(Oct. 7, 2010), http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2010/10/06/actualidad/1286316007_850215.html (Spain). 
83 Richard F. Storrow, “The Phantom Children of the Republic”:  Surrogacy, Globalization and the New 
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twins born to a heterosexual married couple with the help of a surrogate in California as 
French citizens.84  The Spanish press has reported that Spain’s similar response to 
international commercial surrogacy has fallen disparately on the shoulders of gay men who 
cannot “hide” the fact that they have pursued surrogacy abroad.85  Although England, which 
permits uncompensated surrogacy, has dealt with such cases by applying the best-interests 
of the child standard embodied in its parenting order legislation,86 the problems plaguing 
those who seek to evade bans on surrogacy will not be resolved at any time in the near 
future.  Even India’s proposal to pass legislation that would require potential parents to 
prove that surrogacy is permitted in their home country, that their sexual relationship is legal 
in India, and that the child to be born will be permitted entry on the same terms as would a 
biological child of the parents,87 would only likely induce potential parents faced with 
restrictive surrogacy laws at home to pursue surrogacy elsewhere.  The worldwide problem 
has induced the Hague Conference on Private International Law to commence a study on the 
possibility for some form of broader response to the problems arising in the context of 
international commercial surrogacy.88   
Immigration laws that inhibit surrogacy, by refusing to recognize the parent-child 
relationships they create or denying children citizenship, bear a striking relationship to 
regulation that makes it difficult for a social parent to achieve legal parenthood status, 
whether by adopting their partner’s children or by petitioning for recognition as a functional 
parent.  Although it is analogous to step-parent adoption, second-parent adoption, where it is 
available, does not require the legally recognized parent to be married to the party seeking to 
adopt the child.89  Where it is forbidden, such regulation clearly targets the formation of 
unmarried-couple families.  Even where it is allowed, second-parent adoption requirements 
are more onerous than step-parent adoption requirements.90  Adoption as a second-parent 
provides a measure of protection to the non-biological parent of a couple whose relationship 
is not entitled to any legal recognition under state law or who choose not to seek it.  It is a 
mechanism that has often been used by lesbian couples who have employed artificial 
insemination to have children.  Without recognition as a second-parent, the non-biological 
parent risks having no right to a continuing relationship with the child if the legally 
recognized parent later wishes to exclude her and the court refuses to give any weight to her !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Illegitimacy, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 561, 598 (2012). 
84 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters], 1e civ., Apr. 6, 2011, 10-19.053, 
available at http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civil_568 (Fr.).  The case is 
reminiscent of the refusal of the United States to recognize the citizenship of children born to an American 
woman who gave birth abroad after becoming pregnant with the help of an egg provider.  Michele Chabin, In 
Vitro Babies Denied U.S. Citizenship, USA TODAY, March 19, 2012, at 7A (explaining that U.S. policy is to 
deny citizenship to children born overseas to U.S. citizens using in vitro fertilization, unless either the sperm or 
egg used in the process comes from a U.S. citizen).     
85 de Benito, supra note 82. 
86 Storrow,  supra note 83, at 607-08. 
87 MINISTRY OF HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE, THE ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE  TECHNOLOGIES 
(REGULATION) BILL-2010, available at 
http://www.icmr.nic.in/guide/ART%20REGULATION%20Draft%20Bill1.pdf (India). 
88 Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Private International Law Issues Surrounding the Status of 
Children, Including Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements (2011), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2011pd11e.pdf. 
89 Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status 
Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305, 341-42 (2006). 
90 Id. at 336-47. 
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functional parenthood.91  Second-parent adoption is not explicitly permitted in many states, 
however,92 and not all states recognize functional parenthood,93 forcing couples whose 
family formation efforts could benefit from legal recognition to consider whether they 
should relocate to a friendlier jurisdiction, run the risks that lack of recognition entails, or 
forego having children altogether.  As a practical matter, prohibition on second-parent 
adoption and a refusal to recognize functional parenthood may be as ineffectual in inhibiting 
unmarried couples from pursuing assisted reproduction as are immigration laws aimed at 
combating international surrogacy, but these are nonetheless potential barriers to the 
formation of gay, lesbian, and single-parent-headed families via assisted reproduction.   
Finally, several little-known attempts have been made to interfere with the ability of 
gays, lesbians, and singles to gain access to assisted reproduction.  Judith Daar mentions a 
Virginia bill to require “all unrelated gamete donors [to] be identified in a woman’s medical 
chart.”94  She explains that although the bill is facially neutral, it would have a “dramatic 
impact” on single and lesbian women who are dependent upon anonymous sperm 
donation.95  Additionally, an FDA-recommended rule would establish a “ban on gay men as 
sperm donors unless they have been completely celibate for the preceding five years.”96  
Obviously, this proposed rule is neither neutral nor free of stereotypes regarding who should 
be allowed to donate sperm, but it nonetheless does not specifically target who may have 
access to it.  Moreover, the rule may not pose practical problems for most infertility patients, 
since it applies only to anonymous donors and does not disallow one’s choosing a gay man 
to be a known donor.  Even so, the proposed rule is insidious in that it has been used as a 
makeweight argument by doctors who would prefer not to serve gay and lesbian patients.97   
Finally, bans on self-insemination98 impact access by lesbians and single women to a 
common and relatively easy technique that assists them in conceiving children.  One reason 
why self-insemination may be so common among lesbians and single women99 is that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 See, e.g., Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); see also Jones v. Barlow, 
154 P.3d 808, 815 (Utah 2007). 
92 HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, PARENTING LAWS: SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION (2011), available at 
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/parenting_laws_maps%281%29.pdf (indicating that about half the 
states have no law on second-parent adoption or forbid it by judicial decision); NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN 
RIGHTS, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/Legal_Recognition_of_LGBT_Families.pdf?docID=2861. 
93 Id.  
94 Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 46 (2008). 
95 Id.  
96 Beth Littrell, Bias Against Gays and Lesbians, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/13/making-laws-about-making-babies/fertility-industry-
victimizes-gays-and-lesbians. 
97 See, e.g., Barros v. Riggall, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/barros-v-
riggall (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
98 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-772 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.360 (2012).  Fiona Kelly has theorized that 
a provision of Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act could be interpreted as banning at-home self-
insemination.  Fiona Kelly, An Alternative Conception:  The Legality of Home Insemination under Canada’s 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 149, 160-61 (2010).  This provision was overturned, 
however, by Quebec’s successful challenge of the Act on federalism grounds. Reference re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 (Can.). 
99 Angela Cameron, Regulating the Queer Family: The Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 24 CAN. J. 
FAM. L. 101, 112 (2008).   
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“[m]any women may prefer the comfort of home and appreciate a more familiar 
surrounding, as the insemination process, while not complicated, is quite personal and 
invasive.”100 
Barriers in the Clinical Setting  
Where law is not the primary barrier to access, physicians, in their gatekeeping 
function, may effectively bar gays, lesbians, and singles from gaining access to infertility 
care.101  The medical infertility requirement was at the root of the sexual orientation 
discrimination case J.M. v. Q.F.G.  In this case, a lesbian was refused treatment by a 
Queensland clinic whose semen donor program was restricted to heterosexual couples where 
the male partner proved unable to produce semen of sufficient quality to achieve 
pregnancy.102  J.M. sued under the Anti-Discrimination Act prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of lawful sexual activity or partnership.103  The Court of Appeal of the Supreme 
Court of Queensland concluded that the refusal was not due to her lesbianism, but that she 
did not comply with the medical definition of infertility.104  Here we find full judicial 
deference to a convention of the infertility industry to define infertility as “the inability to 
conceive after engaging in unprotected heterosexual intercourse over a period of 12 
months.”105  Thus, it turns out that J.M. had not been rejected for her sexual activity but for 
her sexual inactivity, her refusal to engage in heterosexual intercourse for twelve months.   
In the United States, the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics,106 
promulgated by doctors to self-regulate their profession, speaks in terms of helping patients 
who present with a “medical problem” or a “medical condition.”107  The ability to 
distinguish medical conditions from other disorders may tempt infertility physicians to judge 
that single women and lesbians who wish to reproduce do not present with a “medical” 
problem, but a social one.108  An infertility physician may thus conclude, as did Q.F.G., that 
medical ethics principles do not forbid her from refusing to treat gay or unmarried patients, 
since the refusal to assist arises from a benign choice to help only those who present with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 Harvey L. Fisher & Paula K. Garrett, It Takes Three, Baby: The Lack of Standard, Legal Definitions of 
“Best Interest of the Child” and the Right to Contract for Lesbian Potential Parents, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 1, 4 (2008). 
101 Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. 
L. REV. 1641, 1649 (1984); Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted 
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150-51 (2000). 
102 Stuhmcke, supra note 70, at 249 n.19. 
103 Id. at 246. 
104 J.M. v. Q.F.G. & G.K. [1998] Q.C.A. 228 (Austl.), available at 
www.gaylawnet.com/laws/cases/QCA_228.doc. 
105 Hwang, supra note 6. 
106 AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MED. ETHICS (2010), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics.page?.     
107 Id. at Op. 10.01 (2010), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-
ethics/code-medical-ethics.page?. 
108 In a recent European example of such thinking, it was found that “[m]any clinics refuse to exchange 
oocytes between lesbians when the woman who will become pregnant is fertile because they judge this as a 
social indication not worth the medical investment.”  Katrien Wierckx et al., Reproductive Wish in Transsexual 
Men, 27 HUM. REPROD. 483, 486 (2012) (citing W.J. Dondorp et al., Shared Lesbian Motherhood: A Challenge 
of Established Concepts and Frameworks, 25 HUM. REPROD. 812 (2010)).   
112 LAW JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 3, Fall 2012] !
medical issues.   This justification for a refusal to treat has arisen in the past in connection 
with contraception109 and voluntary sterilization.110   
Today, there is admittedly very little evidence to suggest that infertility patients in the 
United States are turned away by clinics based on whether they meet the test of medical 
infertility as was J.M. by the clinic in Queensland.  But medical infertility may be a reason 
given to mask other forms of discrimination, some of which may be outlawed.111  This raises 
the possibility that physicians may be faced with a choice between violating anti-
discrimination laws and expressing their objection by refusing to treat gay, lesbian, or single 
patients.  Physician John Pearn has expressed his distaste for requiring doctors to treat 
problems of social infertility.112  Patrick O’Connell and Jacques Mistrot have gone even 
further in stating that doctors should not have to conform to anti-discrimination laws that 
force them to perform procedures that are an affront to human dignity.113  These are not 
simply extreme views but can arguably be found in the Code of Medical Ethics itself: a 
religious physician might be tempted to invest the medical ethics principle that physicians 
must act in the best interests of their patients114 with an admonition not to “assist [patients] 
in harming themselves.”115  Consider as well that the wording of both Opinions 10.01 and 
10.015 speak in terms of “medical problems,” “medical condition,” and “alleviate 
suffering.”116  Such terms do not disable physicians from concluding that those presenting 
with “social” infertility do not have a “medical” problem.  Under this reasoning, even a 
referral to another physician would not be necessary.   
As noted above, there have been legislative reforms in some Australian jurisdictions to 
do away with the exclusionary medical-infertility requirement, but a single mother who 
desires artificial insemination to have a child and raise him alone, or a gay or lesbian couple 
seeking egg donation or IVF with a surrogate, may be subjected to discrimination for 
reasons having nothing to do with their inability to have children without assisted 
reproduction.117  Clinicians may turn away single women, or lesbian couples not for failing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 In the landmark family privacy case Griswold v. Connecticut, the State of Connecticut argued in 
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to present with a true medical problem or a problem of “medical futility,” but for being 
capable only of irresponsible or socially inappropriate parenthood.118  Individual physicians 
may object to assisting patients who request help in building families that will not be headed 
by married heterosexual couples.  Although many physicians feel inadequate to the task of 
making such an assessment,119 others may feel bound by a set of values to do so and may 
believe such a decision falls comfortably within the ambit of their professional 
responsibility.  Laws banning discrimination based on family status, marital status, or sexual 
orientation may help combat discriminatory decision making, but, sadly, in the United States 
at least, almost half the states have no statewide prohibition of either marital status or sexual 
orientation discrimination.120   
The United States infertility industry on the whole is not known for turning away 
patients.  With no law regulating who an infertility clinic may accept for treatment,121 and a 
medical establishment actively opposed to regulation,122 it is more likely that clinics will be 
more committed to doing what is necessary to improve their success rates than with turning 
away patients on matters of philosophical or religious principle.  This effort to boost success 
rates may cause clinics to “cherry-pick” patients in order to guarantee high success rates,123 
misrepresent their success rates in order to attract more business,124 or even perform unsafe 
practices in the hope of increasing the likelihood of pregnancy.125  There is a law that 
requires clinics to report their statistics,126 but there is little oversight of this mandate and no 
mechanism to enforce it.127  These realities of infertility practice in the United States might 
suggest that discrimination against gays and lesbians by infertility clinics is not a significant 
problem.   
The fact that infertility clinics have little incentive to discriminate against gays and 
lesbians does not mean that such discrimination does not exist, just that it is largely 
hidden.128  A few cases are worth mentioning.  In Minnesota, a court granted summary !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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122 William R. Keye, Jr. et al., A Survey of the Practices and Opinions of the Domestic Members of the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY 536, 539 (2004). 
123 Elizabeth Weil, Breeder Reaction, MOTHER JONES (Jul. 2006), 
http://motherjones.com/politics/2006/07/breeder-reaction . 
124 Robert Pear, Fertility Clinics Face Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/26/us/fertility-clinics-face-crackdown.html.  But see THE PRESIDENT’S  
COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 
154 (2004) [hereinafter REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY] (suggesting that clinics boost success rates by 
rejecting patients with little hope of becoming pregnant).  
125 REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 124, at 36. 
126 Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 et al. (2012). 
127 REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 124, at 48-49.     
128 R. Alta Charo, And Baby Makes Three—or Four, or Five, or Six: Redefining the Family after the 
Reprotech Revolution, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 231, 240 (2000); DeLair, supra note 104, at 150-51; Holly J. 
Harlow, Paternalism Without Paternity: Discrimination Against Single Women Seeking Artificial Insemination 
by Donor, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 173, 175 (1996); Audra Elizabeth Laabs, Lesbian ART, 19 L. 
& INEQ. J. 65, 82 (2001); Justyn Lezin, (Mis)Conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women’s 
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judgment to a clinic accused of refusing to artificially inseminate a lesbian because of her 
sexual orientation.129  In Massachusetts, the parties settled a similar lawsuit before trial.130  
In Florida, Dennis Barros and his same-sex partner planned to have a child with the help of a 
surrogate mother, but the clinic they chose refused to provide services.131  Other cases have 
involved single women and lesbians who alleged they were denied treatment because of 
their marital status or sexual orientation132 or where their lack of a partner was of concern to 
physicians.133  There is a body of empirical evidence suggesting that many clinics would be 
likely to turn away single women and lesbian couples.134  Stories of clinics that reject single 
women, gays, and lesbians are simply part of a larger culture clash between those who wish 
to bring religiously motivated discrimination into the public marketplace and protected 
classes seeking access to certain services.135  The lack of litigation over this form of 
discrimination in infertility clinics is evidence that, as a practical matter, if refused treatment 
at one clinic, applicants merely proceed to another.136   
 Whether infertility physicians should be permitted to refuse to perform procedures for 
those of whom they disapprove has been the subject of an ethics report produced by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Access to Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 185, 199-
200 (2003). 
129 See Harlow, supra note 126, at 207-12. 
130 Id. at 212-13. 
131 Barros v. Riggall, supra note 98.  The clinic claimed it was applying a Food and Drug Administration 
guideline against using the sperm of sexually active gay men in infertility treatment.  Littrell, supra note 97. 
132 See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 15, at 185-86; Carol M. Ostrom & 
Warren King, Infertility Clinic Accused of Past Bias—Women Say Lesbians, Singles Turned Away by UW 
Facility, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 21, 1993), 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19931121&slug=1733101; Press Ass’n, MPs 
Challenge Fertility Clinic Ban on Lesbians, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 2, 2006, at 7, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/jul/03/politics.gayrights (highlighting the political response to fertility 
clinics' refusal to treat single women and lesbians).   
133 John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 7, 30 (2004); Lesbian Denied Fertility Treatment Wins Complaint, CTV NEWS (Oct. 1, 2005), 
http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Canada/20050930/invitro_lawsuit_050930/ (reporting on a ruling of the Quebec 
Human Rights Commission that ordered a fertility clinic to pay thousands of dollars of compensation to a 
woman who was refused fertility treatments because she was not accompanied by a man).  
134 See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 15, at 187 (reporting on a survey of 
Canadian clinics); Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 65 (2005); Judy E. Stern et al., Access to Services at 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics: A Survey of Policies and Practices, 184 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 591, 596-97 (2001); Patricia Baetens, Reproductive Services with Lesbian Couples, in 
GUIDELINES FOR COUNSELLING IN INFERTILITY 109, 109-12 (Jacky Boivin & Heribert Kentenich eds., 2002), 
available at  
http://www.eshre.eu/binarydata.aspx?type=doc&sessionId=ymvlvpn2etukjl45szfj01rm/psyguidelines.pdf 
(explaining that many fertility centers do not accept lesbian couples for treatment); Jacky Boivin, Reproductive 
Services with Single Women Without Partners, in GUIDELINES FOR COUNSELLING IN INFERTILITY, supra, at 
113, 113-16 (exploring cases in which conception is prevented by a person's social circumstances, such as 
being a single woman without a partner, rather than one's medical status). 
135 Barbara Bradley Hagerty, When Gay Rights and Religious Liberties Clash, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 
16, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91486191 (describing ten examples of this 
clash). 
136 Laura Josephs, Therapist Anxiety about Motivation for Parenthood, in FROZEN DREAMS: 
PSYCHODYNAMIC DIMENSIONS OF INFERTILITY AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 33, 37 (Allison Rosen & Jay 
Rosen eds., 2005). 
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American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM).137  ASRM issued a report related 
specifically to the provision of services to gays and lesbians.  ASRM identified three 
important values at play in the ethical debate whether clinics may or must assist single 
individuals and gay and lesbian couples: reproductive autonomy, child welfare, and 
professional responsibility.138  The society concluded that the balance was best struck in 
favor of equal treatment of heterosexual couples, single persons, and gay and lesbian 
couples by infertility clinics.139  The society believes that in the absence of other factors, 
being single, gay, or lesbian is not an ethical basis for the denial of treatment.140    
Although discrimination against gays, lesbians, and singles may be ethically suspect, 
the stark reality is that there are, as noted above, very few laws that prohibit such 
discrimination.  The following map illustrates the problem: 
 
Where such laws do exist, it has been ruled that physicians’ offices are covered by the 
prohibition.141  This is no guarantee, however, that a physician will not make a decision to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Access to Fertility Treatment by Gays, Lesbians, and 
Unmarried Persons, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1190 (2009).  
138 Id. at 1191. 
139 Id. at 1192. 
140 Id.  
141 N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 15, at 186 (citing Cahill v. Rosa, 89 N.Y.2d  
14, 21 (N.Y. 1996)).  Infertility clinics may fall outside the ambit of such legislation, however, if they are not 
considered places of public accommodation. Courts have reached different conclusions on whether medical 
clinics are places of public accommodation. Compare Duffy v. Ill. Dep't of Human Rights, 820 N.E.2d 1186, 
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refuse or terminate treatment based on a patient’s sexual orientation or marital status.  
Compounding the problem of combating discrimination even where prohibitions exist are 
cases where physicians base their refusal to treat on a religious belief.  The argument in such 
cases is not that the religious nature of the refusal renders it nondiscriminatory but that, as 
O’Connell and Mistrot point out, in matters of conscience, physicians should be exempt 
from anti-discrimination laws.142 Some physicians even urge that the Code of Medical 
Ethics provides cover for such refusals, as long as the refusal is a matter of conscience and a 
referral to another physician is made in good faith.143   
The best known case of this type is North Coast Women’s Health Care Group v. 
Superior Court.144  The case presented the classic dilemma of a nontraditional family 
seeking help from a conservative medical establishment in order to have children.  North 
Coast Women’s Care Medical Group contracts with insurers to provide infertility treatment 
to their subscribers.145  Guadalupe Benitez, a lesbian, received basic infertility treatment 
from North Coast under the terms of her employer-provided health insurance plan until it 
became clear she would require intra-uterine insemination.146  At that point, North Coast 
raised religious objections to helping her become pregnant, referred Benitez to a clinic not 
covered by her insurance, and reimbursed her for the cost of treatment at the new location.147  
Although the treatment at the new clinic was successful, Benitez brought suit under the 
Unruh Act, a California law specifically prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in 
public accommodations.148  The California Supreme Court granted review after summary 
judgment for Benitez was overturned.149  The Court framed the issue as whether a physician 
is constitutionally insulated from the Unruh Act when the discrimination arises out of 
sincerely held religious beliefs.150   
Although the doctors claimed to have discriminatory motives only toward unmarried 
women, a group unprotected by the Unruh Act at the time the relevant incidents took place, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that the provisions of the public accommodations statute in question do not 
apply to medical facilities or clinics, doctors' offices, or health care facilities), with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ADA TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL COVERING PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES III-1.2000 (1993), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3.html (indicating that the public accommodations section of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act only applies to an exhaustive list of facilities that does not specifically include 
health clinics, but does include offices of health care providers and hospitals). The Illinois Human Rights Act 
was amended in 2007 and now explicitly covers the professional offices of health care providers. 775 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-101 (West 2007).  But see Guido Pennings, Decision-Making Authority of Patients 
and Fertility Specialists in Belgian Law, 15 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 19, 22 (2007) (describing a new 
Belgian law covering assisted reproduction that gives infertility clinics the right to refuse treatment for reasons 
of religious conscience). 
142 O’Connell & Mistrot, supra note 113, at 1891. 
143 See, e.g., Petitioners’ Answer to Brief of Amici Curiae Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass’n, et al. at 3-4, N. 
Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp. v. San Diego Cnty. Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (No. S142892), 2007 
WL 2085958 [hereinafter Petitioners’ Answer to Brief]. 
144 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008). 
145 Benitez v. N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
146 N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., 189 P.3d at 963-64. 
147 N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp. v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636, 640-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), 
rev'd sub nom.189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008). 
148 N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., 189 P.3d at 964-65. 
149 Id. at 959. 
150 Issues Ordered Limited, Docket Entry of June 28, 2006, N. Coast Women’s Care Grp., 189 P.3d 959 
(No. S142892) (citing California Rules of Court, Rule 29(a)(1)). 
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it was never definitively established whether they objected to treating unmarried women, 
lesbian couples, or both.  The Supreme Court did not have to resolve this issue to rule that 
discrimination grounded in religious belief is not exempted from the Act’s ambit.151  In the 
wake of the Court’s decision that doctors with religious scruples are not exempt from the 
Act, North Coast and Benitez settled the lawsuit for an unspecified sum.152   
One of the oddest aspects of North Coast was that the doctors Benitez and Clark 
consulted had no objection to helping Benitez become pregnant at first.153  It was not until 
she required the technique of intrauterine insemination that their religious scruples were 
triggered.154  Even more peculiar was the obvious lack of agreement among physicians 
groups weighing in on the matter about whether the actions of North Coast’s physicians 
were permissible under the Code of Medical Ethics.155  The physician defendants, of course, 
argued that the Code of Medical Ethics permits doctors to refuse to treat a patient for 
religious reasons as long as they provide an immediate and effective referral to another 
physician who will perform the service.156  Just as in Bragdon, where the American Dental 
Association submitted an amicus curiae brief asking the court to rule in Bragdon’s favor,157 
several medical societies believed that North Coast should prevail.158  But amid the flurry of 
filings of amici briefs discussing the medical ethics aspects of the case was an equal number 
taking Benitez’s side.159  The California Medical Association changed its mind in the middle 
of the lawsuit.160  The briefs of the various medical society amici exhibited striking 
disagreement about what the ethics rules governing their profession require.  
It is generally accepted that a doctor may refuse the initial treatment of a patient for a 
nondiscriminatory reason,161 but once a doctor has agreed to treat a patient, she has a duty !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 Richard F. Storrow, Medical Conscience and the Policing of Parenthood, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 369, 372-76 (2010) (describing the court’s reasoning on this free exercise question). 
152 Greg Moran, Lesbian's Suit Over Procedure is Settled, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 30, 2009, at B1; 
Press Release, O’Melveny & Meyers LLP, O'Melveny Reaches Settlement in Landmark Discrimination Suit 
(Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.omm.com/newsroom/News.aspx?news=1298. 
153 N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., 189 P.3d at 963 (indicating Benitez had been in North Coast's care 
for almost a year before she was refused care). 
154 Id. at 963-64. 
155 Storrow, supra note 151, at 382-87. 
156 Petitioners’ Answer to Brief, supra note 143, at 3-4.  
157 O’BRIEN, supra note 3, at 272 n.133. 
158 See, e.g., Brief for Christian Med. and Dental Ass'ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, N. Coast 
Women's Care Med. Grp. v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (No. D045438); Brief of 
Christian Legal Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp.,,189 P.3d 
959 (No. S142892); Proposed Brief of the Islamic Medical Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., 189 P.3d 959 (No. S142892); Brief for Cal. Med. Ass'n Supporting 
Petitioners, N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp.,  40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (No. D045438).  The California Medical 
Association later reversed its position.  See Notice of Errata Regarding Amicus Brief of Cal. Med. Ass'n at 2, 
N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp.,  40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (No. D045438).    
159 See, e.g., Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Real Party in Interest, N. 
Coast Women's Care Med. Grp.,  40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (No. D045438); Brief for Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass'n 
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Real Party in Interest, N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., 189 P.3d 959 (No. 
S142892).   
160 Notice of Errata Regarding Amicus Brief of Cal. Med. Ass’n at 2, N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., 
40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (No. D045438) (on file with author). 
161 See AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 106, at Op. 9.12 (prohibiting physician’s discrimination against 
potential patients on the basis of “race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, or 
any other basis that would constitute invidious discrimination.”); see also AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 106, at 
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not to neglect or abandon that patient.  The debate in the amici briefs, then, was whether 
North Coast’s physicians had breached any medical ethics rules in refusing to treat her but 
sending her to another physician from whom she received successful treatment.162  It is thus 
odd that none of the parties to, or amici in this case, considered the applicability of the Code 
of Medical Ethics provisions concerning the neglect of patients and when a physician may 
ethically refuse to treat a patient but must refer her elsewhere.  
Opinion 8.11 of the Code of Medical Ethics reads, “[p]hysicians are free to choose 
whom they will serve. The physician should, however, respond to the best of his or her 
ability in cases of emergency where first aid treatment is essential.  Once having undertaken 
a case, the physician should not neglect the patient.”163  Opinion 10.01 describes the 
fundamental character of a physician-patient relationship as a “collaborative effort” and a 
“mutually respectful alliance” in which the parties share the responsibility for making health 
care decisions.164 Within this framework, patients have the right to be treated with courtesy 
and dignity and have the right to continuity of health care. “The physician may not 
discontinue treatment of a patient as long as further treatment is medically indicated, without 
giving the patient reasonable assistance and sufficient opportunity to make alternative 
arrangements for care.”165 Added to this is the understanding from Opinion 10.015 that a 
physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary relationship in which the physician’s self-
interest is subordinate to his duty to promote the patient’s best interests and advocate for her 
welfare.166 It may be possible to read into these provisions the anti-discrimination language 
of Opinions 9.12 and 10.05, the Opinions that captured the attention of the various players in 
North Coast, but one cannot do so directly, since those provisions apply to the acceptance or 
denial of potential patients by their own explicit terms.  It may be a good idea to assume 
from the specific language of the Code of Medical Ethics Principles that a physician who 
decides to discriminate in the course of an ongoing physician-patient relationship is not 
respectful of the law, respectful of human rights and dignity, or even supportive of access to 
medical care for all people.167 Perhaps the Principles’ Preamble can be read together with 
Opinions 10.01and 10.015 to conclude that it is simply not honorable or respectful for a 
physician to discriminate, because it is of no benefit to a patient, does not promote her best 
interests and welfare, and arguably exacerbates rather than alleviates her suffering.168  
Unfortunately, the vague and general language of these provisions, when contrasted with the 
forceful nondiscrimination language embodied in the provisions applicable to potential 
patients raises doubt, as North Coast noted,169 about whether any provisions of the Code are 
suited to assist a court, or an American Medical Association disciplinary board for that 
matter,170 in resolving a case like North Coast. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Op. 10.05(2)(b) (prohibiting physician’s discrimination against potential patients on the basis of “race, gender, 
sexual orientation, or any other criteria that would constitute invidious discrimination”). 
162 Storrow, supra note 151, at 382-87. 
163 AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 106, at Op. 8.11. 
164 Id. at Op. 10.01. 
165 Id. at Op. 10.01(5). 
166 Id. at Op. 10.015. 
167 Id. at princs. I, III, and IX. 
168 Id. at pmbl., Op. 10.01, Op. 10.015. 
169 Petitioners’ Answer to Brief, supra note 143, at 6-7. 
170 The AMA’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs is vested with the power to “censure, or place on 
probation the accused physician or suspend or expel him or her from AMA membership as the facts may 
justify.” AM. MED. ASS’N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, RULES IN CASES OF ORIGINAL 
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At first blush, the resolution to the questions raised here about medical ethics principles 
might appear straightforward.  As a practical matter, Benitez did eventually receive what she 
was seeking without any additional expense.  Or did she?  Anti-discrimination statutes are 
meant to advance several compelling public interests beyond averting economic harm, 
among these, combating “humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience to residents and non-
residents alike, . . . breaches of the peace, inter-group tensions and conflicts and similar 
evils.”171  The scholarly literature on discrimination strongly indicates that discrimination 
incurs a deep psychic cost, no matter what the other more material damages might be.172  
Indeed Joann Clark, Benitez’s partner, eloquently captured the effect that discrimination has, 
whether the aim of acquiring medical treatment is achieved or not:  “[Clark] commented, ‘I 
had no idea the depths that [discrimination] reaches.  Personally and psychologically, it 
destroys you.’”173 
Conclusion 
Gays, lesbians, and singles commonly encounter barriers when they seek assistance to 
have children.  Some will choose to bypass the medical establishment entirely and will self-
inseminate; others will choose to employ an infertility physician in their quest to have 
children.  Because the practice of infertility medicine opens new and unfamiliar avenues to 
family formation, it also raises fierce anxieties in society about who should be allowed to 
become a parent and who should not.  In this debate, entrenched attitudes about marriage 
and procreation have been repackaged to express antipathy toward nontraditional families 
and functional parenthood unbuttressed by genetic or gestational connections.  
Unsurprisingly, then, many of the same battles about parentage and legitimacy that used to 
arise from concerns about the place of marriage in society continue to be fought against the 
backdrop of those who use reproductive technologies.  Equally unsurprising is the prominent 
role of marital status and sexual orientation discrimination in this struggle.  Legislatures 
have passed laws mandating the delivery of infertility care only to heterosexual couples.  
Administrative agencies have enforced laws, otherwise facially neutral, in ways that exclude 
gays, lesbians, and singles from pursuing parenthood.  Finally, physicians, because they are 
the purveyors of the technology, may perceive that they are entitled to exclude certain 
individuals from having access to it based on the perception that certain classes of 
individuals lack the capacity to provide minimally adequate care.   
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JURISDICTION, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/ama-councils/council-
ethical-judicial-affairs/governing-rules/rules-cases-original-jurisdiction.page?.  
171 PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE § 651.01(e) (2006) (“Discrimination in . . . public accommodations . . . [creates] 
humiliation, embarrassment and inconvenience to residents and [non-residents alike and] tends to create 
breaches of the peace, inter-group tensions and conflicts and similar evils.”), available at 
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=13525; LEXINGTON, KY., CODE § 2-33 (1999), available at 
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=11163.  See also Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. 
Super. Ct. 85 P.3d 67, 92 (Cal. 2004) (declaring elimination of gender discrimination a compelling state 
interest).   
172 See Broome v. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211, 225-26 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
173 Charlsie Dewey, In the Life Examines Doctors and Anti-Gay Bias, WINDY CITY TIMES (June 20, 2007), 
http://www.windycitymediagroup.com/lgbt/In-the-Life-Examines-Doctors-and-Anti-Gay-Bias/15274.html; see 
also Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Gay Rights, Religious Liberties: A Three-Act Story, NAT’L PUB. RADIO ( June 
16, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91486191 (recounting painful feelings 
including shock, anger and fear). 
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Several of the legal developments detailed in this article indicate a slight trend in the 
direction of relaxing restrictions on access to assisted reproduction by those not in 
heterosexual relationships.  It is a given that the science of assisted reproduction will 
continue to evolve.  In the future, it may even be possible for gay and lesbian couples to 
have children genetically related to both of them, without the necessity of donor gametes 
and surrogates.174  Such technology may not develop until far into the future.  If that day 
ever arrives, it is to be hoped that discriminatory animus against gays, lesbians, and single 
individuals who wish to become parents will be a dim memory from a distant past. 
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174 C. Strong, Reproductive Cloning Combined with Genetic Modification, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 654 (2005). 
